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In this paper, I try to develop a framework, which presents the factors influencing the locational 
flexibility of a multinational enterprise (the difficulty/ease with which it can transfer its manufacturing 
activity from the initial host territory to another territory). I differentiate five factors: (1) the nature 
(generic vs. specific) of the territorial resources used by the multinational’s subsidiary; (2) market 
access offered by production in the host territory; (3) the durability and specificity of the assets owned 
by the multinational enterprise in the host territory; (4) other barriers making exit out of the host 
territory difficult (redundancy costs, interrelatedness of the subsidiary’s activity with other units of the 
multinational enterprise, etc.); and (5) the availability of substitute plants by the multinational 
enterprise that can take over the production of the host territory’s subsidiary. Once the framework is 
presented, I use it to analyse the mobility potential of the activities of two multinational enterprises: a 
Taiwanese company (Nien Hsing Textile Co.) that was assembling trousers in Nicaragua (fieldwork in 
1998 and 2007) and a Japanese company (Sony) that was assembling television sets and 
manufacturing cathode ray tubes in Wales (fieldwork in 2000-2001). The study shows the importance, 
in the short run, of the heaviness of the capital goods used in production as factor limiting mobility. In 
the long run, however, the degree of specificity (uniqueness) of the territorial resources employed by 
the multinational enterprise (qualified labour, specialised suppliers, etc.) is crucial. The study shows 
also the risk of the “no-upgrading trap” of inward manufacturing investment for peripheral host 
territories. Indeed, multinational enterprises that realise small profit margin activities, and in which 
labour costs occupy an important share in total production costs, will want to maintain their 
international locational flexibility to be able to respond swiftly to changes in the configuration of 
location advantages. Therefore, they will restrict their sunk investments (in fixed assets, in training, in 
collaborations with local suppliers, etc.) in the host territory. This strategy counters the local 
embeddedness of the subsidiary and limits its structural economic impact on the host territory. 
Keywords: delocalisation, foreign direct investment, clothing industry, maquiladora industry, 
consumer electronics, Nicaragua, Wales. 
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1. Question and methodology 
1.1. Question  
Economic globalisation is associated with volatility of the firm’s environment and within that 
environment short term profitability, speed of reaction and flexibility1 of the firm are crucial 
(Krugman, 2005; Michalet, 2004; Buckley and Casson, 1998). In this paper, we look more 
closely at one kind of flexibility: locational flexibility or mobility capacity of the 
manufacturing multinational enterprise (MNE) (the difficulty/ease with which it can transfer 
its manufacturing activity from the initial host territory to another territory2). The wish of the 
MNE to maintain its locational flexibility can counter the integration of its production facility 
(the subsidiary) into the host territory (Krifa and Héran, 1999; Fröbel et al., 1980).  
 
In order to study the question of the locational flexibility of the MNE, I will first present a 
framework which describes the factors this capacity depends on. I will then use it to analyse 
two very different subsidiaries:  
 
1/ The maquiladora subsidiary of a Taiwanese clothing manufacturing company (Nien 
Hsing Textile Co.) in Nicaragua (assembly of trousers) in 1998 and 2007. 
2/ Sony’s manufacturing subsidiary in Wales (Sony Manufacturing UK) (assembly of 
television sets and manufacturing of cathode ray tubes) in 2000-2001.  
 
I realized the fieldwork (corporate and expert interviews, recollecting data) during various 
stays in Nicaragua and Wales in the years mentioned above. This allowed me to directly 
observe the subsidiary and its context, and to speak with the actors involved (managers, trade 
union representatives, government workers, researchers, etc.) and get their feedback (see 
Helper, 2000; Schoenberger, 1991)3. 
 
                                                 
1 Buckley and Casson (1998: 23) define flexibility as “the ability to reallocate resources quickly and smoothly in 
response to change”. 
2 Such a transfer of the manufacturing activity can have very different implications for the plant of the MNE: it 
may suppose the transfer of one of its various product lines (i.e. a multi-product plant losing the assignment to 
manufacture one product) or, in the worst case, it may imply the closure of the plant (i.e. a mono-product plant 
losing the assignment of the only product it was manufacturing). 
3 As S. Helper (2000) pertinently observes in her defence of field research as a research method, one of A. 
Smith’s “The wealth of nations” central ideas – the advantages of the division of labour – originate from the visit 
by the author to a pin factory. 
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As for the use of two cases, I think that the distance that separates them – different 
subsidiaries, MNEs, industries and territories – can be an element that enriches our analysis. 
As K. Eisenhardt (1989) remarks, use of extreme cases can render the process or phenomenon 
of interest more easily “observable.” Furthermore, studying two cases can make you think 
about new questions that would not have come forward analysing only one. Finally, the 
similarities found in the study of two (very) different cases may reveal something more 
general, something common to many manufacturing subsidiaries. 
  
2. Framework 
In this paper, I will concentrate on selective closure4, not only of a site, but also of a product 
line/volume (i.e. the transfer of one of the subsidiary’s product line or volume to another plant 
of the MNE without implying the closure of the host territory’s plant). 
 
The theoretical foundation used to build this framework on are Dunning’s eclectic paradigm 
of international production5, a paper of M. Porter (1976) on exit barriers and, finally, B. 
Kogut’s (1985) explanation of the “operational flexibility” of the MNE (i.e. the capability of 
the MNE to shift its production from one place to  another in response to currency changes).  
 
Figure 1 shows the different factors influencing the mobility potential of the manufacturing 







                                                 
4 Selective closure refers to the decision of a multiplant enterprise to abandon the manufacturing of a product in 
one of its plants while maintaining it in one or more of its other plants (Stafford, 1991). 
5 J. Dunning’s eclectic paradigm explains why a MNE decides to produce in other country. This occurs when 
there is a combination of three categories of advantages: ownership advantages (the competitive advantage of 
the MNE with respect to the domestic firms of the host territory), internalization advantages (it must be 
interesting for the MNE to realize itself the production in the host territory and not subcontract it to another firm) 
and location advantages (the host territory must offer advantages to the MNE for the latter to realize production 
in this territory and not in another one) (Dunning, 1993). The desinvestment decision would be the other way 
round: when one of these three advantages ceases to exist, the MNE will, in the long run, stop its production in 
the host territory (Boddewyn, 1983). 
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Figure 1: The factors influencing the mobility potential of the manufacturing activity of the MNE 
 
The mobility potential of the 
manufacturing activity of the 
multinational enterprise
The specificity of the productive resources offered by the 
host territory to the MNE
The durability and specificity of the fixed assets used by the 
multinational enterprise in the host territory
The possession of substitute plants 
Market access or proximity offered by production in the 
host territory
(bypassing of trade barriers, diminution of transport costs, 
product adaptation to the tastes and preferences of local 
consumers, capacity to respond more swiftly to changes in 
demand, etc.)  
Other factors that limit the mobility potential of the 
manufacturing activity
(the fixed exit costs (from the host region), the degree of 
interrelatedness between the host territory subsidiary and the 
other units of the multinational enterprise, the affective and 




Let us explain some of these factors influencing the locational flexibility of the MNE.   
2.1.Territorial resources: specific or generic? 
We are in the presence of specific territorial resources when the activity carried out by the 
MNE depends on resources that are specific to the host territory (e.g. particular knowledge 
and skills of the workforce, collaboration with suppliers of complex components or with 
research centres) (Benko and Pecqueur, 2001). M. Storper (1997: 21) talks about a 
“territorialized” activity: an activity whose economic viability depends on resources “that are 
not available in many places and that cannot easily or quickly be created or imitated in places 
that lack them”. If the activity of the MNE uses such specific territorial resources, it will be 
difficult to transfer it to another territory.  
 
The generic territorial resources, on the other hand, do not enable the host territory to 
differentiate itself from other territories in the field of the inputs needed by the MNE. The 
territorial resources employed by the enterprise exist in many other regions. For example, 
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unskilled labour doing a simple and routine task, such as sewing a T-shirt, is a typical generic 
(ubiquitous) territorial resource which can be found nearly everywhere in the world (Benko, 
2001). As a result, such a territorial resource does not restrict the locational flexibility of the 
activity of the MNE.  
 
The entirely generic and entirely specific territorial resources are at both ends of a scale on 
which the degree of specificity of the territorial resources can be measured. The higher the 
specificity of the territorial resources used by the MNE, the more limited the number of places 
capable of hosting its activity. 
2.2.Market access or proximity  
Market access (e.g. the bypassing of trade barriers, the diminution of transport costs) or 
market proximity (e.g. the reduction of the time needed to respond to changes in demand, the 
adaptation of the product to the preferences of local consumers) that the production in the host 
territory offers to the MNE may limit the range of places where its manufacturing activity 
may be located. This factor is often the first condition that must be satisfied for the MNE to 
consider producing in the host territory (Michalet, 1999). 
2.3. Durable and specific assets 
When the MNE considers leaving a territory, it must think of what it will do with the fixed 
assets (such as equipments and buildings) it owns in that territory and that are not yet 
depreciated. It may resell them or transfer them (use them in another place), but this is not 
always possible. Some fixed assets are specific to a particular enterprise and to a particular 
location6 (Porter, 1976). 
 
The more specific the fixed assets used in the host territory, the higher the cost implied by 
their resale (book losses) or their transfer to another place (dismantling, transporting and 
reinstalling) is, in proportion to the net book value of the assets in question7. The more 
durable the specific fixed assets are, i.e. the longer their useful economic life is, the greater 
the number of years during which this effect of specificity will be felt. 
                                                 
6 The typical example of a durable and specific asset is that of some heavy indivisible equipment used to make a 
particular product with its own design. 
7 The net book value of a fixed asset corresponds to its purchase value minus its depreciation. The book losses 
are the difference between the net book value and the resale value. 
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These exit costs may force the MNE to stay, in the short run, in the host territory even if the 
latter has lost, as a result of a change in the economic and political environment (e.g. an 
enlargement of the trading block which the host territory is part of, an appreciation of the 
currency of the host country) its location advantages for the MNE8. Only once the specific 
fixed assets are depreciated, can the MNE respond, without book losses, to the changes in the 
configuration of the location advantages9.   
2.4. Other factors limiting the mobility potential of the manufacturing activity of the 
MNE 
By relying upon M. Porter (1976), J. Boddewyn (1983) and H. Krifa and F. Héran (1999), we 
can mention other factors that hinder exit of the MNE activity from the host territory – factors 
that impede the enterprise to respond swiftly to a new configuration of location advantages – 
namely: 
 
– The “fixed exit costs” from the host territory. That is, the costs associated with the closure 
or sale of the subsidiary or the shutdown of one of its manufacturing activities (e.g. 
redundancy payments, (partial) refund of the grants given by the authorities). 
– The interrelatedness of the subsidiary activity with other units of the MNE. If the 
subsidiary realizes an activity, which other units of the MNE depend on (it is, for example, 
the only unit making an essential component), the shutdown of the latter will require an 
important reorganization within the MNE. 
– Affective and professional obstacles of the managers (e.g. the subsidiary managers’ 
attachment to a site, their reluctance to make workers redundant)10. 
– The pressures (restrictive measures or threats) of the host territory authorities.  
                                                 
8 The MNE will decide to produce in a territory insofar as the latter offers location advantages, i.e. advantages in 
comparison with other territories in the fields (1) of the cost and of the quality of the territorial resources (labour 
cost, competitiveness of the local suppliers, presence of skilled and experienced technicians for the maintenance 
of the machines, etc.) and/or (2) of the access to a market (reduction in transport costs, bypassing of trade 
barriers, etc.). 
9 I use M. Porter’s explanation (1976) of the role played by durable and specific assets as barrier to exit from a 
business. This explanation can also be applied to the exit from a territory (see Boddewyn, 1983; Krifa and Héran, 
1999). 
10 Let us note, however, that the final decision as regards the closure of a production line or a subsidiary is 
generally taken in the corporate headquarters by people who are far away from the victims of the closure (see 
Layan, 2005).   
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2.5. Possession of substitute plants 
The MNE will be able to transfer its production more easily out of the host territory, if it 
possesses plants in other territories, which (1) make the same kind of products as the plant in 
the host territory and (2) have access to the same market as the latter. Centralization of 
product development (so that the different plants produce a relatively homogeneous product) 
and of the sourcing of components (so that the key components are provided by the same 
suppliers to the different plants) will facilitate this locational flexibility within the MNE 
(Rangan, 1998). 
 
Plant scale economies11 may forbid the existence of substitute plants. Indeed, if plant scale 
economies are important, it can be better for the MNE to concentrate its production in one 
single plant (at the level of the regional economic block or at the world level) to be able to 
reach a sufficiently high level of production to use up these economies (Kogut, 1985). 
 
3. Two case studies 
This section presents each host territory and subsidiary and explains the parent’s company 
motivations to produce in the host territory. Table 1 presents an overview of the two cases. 
Table 1: The two subsidiaries: an overview 
 
The maquiladora subsidiary 
(Nien Hsing Textile Co.) 
(2007) 
Sony Manufacturing UK 
(2000-2001) 
Realization of the field study Summer 1998 and March 2007 Summer 2000 till summer 2001 
Host country Developing country (Nicaragua) Developed country (United Kingdom) 
Policy for attracting FDI 
Active policy via preferential 
advantages offered to the foreign 
investor in the framework of the export 
processing zone regime.  
Active policy via, among other things, 
subsidies, loans and preferential 
conditions, site development, training of 
employees and local suppliers to 
subsidiaries 
Industry Textile-clothing Consumer electronics 
MNE to which the subsidiary 
belongs 
Taiwanese subcontracting company that 
manufactures clothing (jeans) for 
retailers, branded manufacturers and 
branded marketers 
One of the largest global consumer 
electronics companies  
Degree of competition in the 
MNE’s product market 
Strong competition (in price) in the 
market for the apparel assembly service 
– Strong competition in the market 
for televisions and computer 
monitors 
– Less strong competition in the 
                                                 
11 There are plant scale economies when an increase in the size of the plant (and therefore of the plant’s 
production level) allows a reduction in the average production costs. These plant scale economies differ from the 
firm scale economies that refer to the relations between the average costs and the size of the legal unit (the firm) 
instead of the production unit (the plant) (Morvan, 1991: 224). 
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professional camera market 
Principal motivation for 
investment in the host territory 
Access to the US market (essentially to 
circumvent trade barriers) 
Access to the European Union market 
(to circumvent trade barriers and to 
reduce transport costs) 
Date of start of production in 
the host territory  1993
(a) 1974 
Number of different products 
manufactured in the 
subsidiary 
One (trousers  or shorts) 
Diverse (cathode ray tubes, televisions, 
computer monitors and professional 
cameras) 
Operations performed in the 
subsidiary 
– Assembly of the trouser (fabric 
cutting, washing, buttoning, 
ironing, packaging) 
– Dyeing and printing of fabric (for 
casual trousers) 
– Manufacturing of cardboard boxes 
– Manufacturing of cathode ray tubes 
– Assembly of televisions, computer 
monitors and professional cameras 
– Design and development (design of 
new television models) 
Investments made in the host 
territory 
Low and in “light” capital goods 
(sewing machines, button-placing 
machines, washing machines, etc.)  
High and, in regard to cathode ray tube 
production, in “heavy” capital goods 
(ovens, etc.) 
Relations with local suppliers 
of intermediary inputs Nearly totally absent Existant 
Positions of responsibility in 
the subsidiary Occupied by expatriates 
Occupied by expatriates and national 
officials 
  Note: (a) Date of the installation of the first Nien Hsing Textile Co. plant in Nicaragua, in the “Las Mercedes” free trade 
zone of Managua. 
3.1. The maquiladora subsidiary (Nien Hsing Textile Co.) in Nicaragua (2007) 
Nicaragua is a Central American country12 of some 5.75 million inhabitants (as of 2005). The 
economic situation of the country is difficult: with a GDP per capita of US$850 in 2005, it is 
one of the poorest countries in Latin America13 (Banco Central de Nicaragua, 2007). The 
Nicaraguan manufacturing industry is poorly developed: the stock of capital goods is old, it 
imports a high proportion of intermediary inputs and capital goods, and it often has 
difficulties competing with foreign enterprises (including the Central Americans) (CADIN, 
2001; PEMCE, 2006). Since the beginning of the 1990’s, the Nicaraguan governing 
authorities have used the instrument of the export processing zone or “export industrial free 
trade zones” (zonas francas industriales de exportación) to attract foreign manufacturing 
investments and to promote manufacturing exports. The totality of the firms of the export 
processing zones contributed, in 2006, to 4,7% of Nicaraguan GDP (CEPAL, 2007).    
 
Nien Hsing Textile Co. is a large Taiwanese MNE of the textile-clothing industry. It is 
vertically integrated and carries out the production of denim fabric and the manufacture of 
                                                 
12 Five countries form Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. 
13 Due to its recent turbulent history (the Sandinista revolution at the end of the 1970’s, the war against the 
Contras, the socialization of the economy, the capital flight and the hyper-inflation in the 1980’s, the 
disappearance of the cotton activity, the difficult transition from a socialist to a market economy at the start of 
the 1990’s, etc.), Nicaragua’s real GDP in 1999 was 18% lower than it was in 1977 (CADIN, 2001). 
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jeans and tweed (casual) trousers. As the majority of the other Asian subcontracting 
enterprises in the clothing industry, it offers to its clients (VF Jeans (Lee, Wrangler), Tommy 
Hilfiger Jeans, Levi Strauss, The Gap, Wal-Mart, etc.) the full-package subcontracting 
modality14. On a world level, Nien Hsing Textile Co. had, in 2007, more than 60.000 
employees distributed in seven countries15.  
 
Nien Hsing Textile Co. had seven factories in Nicaragua (see Table 2): six in two different 
export processing zones16 and one (the dyeing mill) as an “isolated” factory also benefitting 
from the free trade zone regime. They were all situated in the outskirts of the capital 
Managua. The Nicaraguan plants concentrated only on manufacturing and lacked higher-level 
administrative functions such as sales, marketing, R&D, etc. which were done in other sites of 
the MNE (Taiwan, United States). In 2007, the seven plants employed in total some 16.000 
workers.  
Table 2: The plants of Nien Hsing Textile Co. in Nicaragua (2007)  
Plants of Nien Hsing Textile Co. in the free trade zone “Las Mercedes” 
 Henry Garments Chih Hsing Nien Hsing Garments 





Employment (December 2006) 2.867 2.784 3.042 
Establishment date of the plant 1995 1997 1994 
Plants of Nien Hsing Textile Co. outside the free trade zone “Las Mercedes” 
Plants of Nien Hsing Textile Co. in the free trade 
zone “Saratoga”  
Chao Hsing John Garments Cartonera industrial 
Alpha Textil 






printing of fabric 
Employment (December 2006) 3.412 3.856 97 238 
Establishment date of the plant 1999 2001 2002 2002 
Source : Comisión Nacional de Zonas Francas and consolidated financial statements for the years 2007 and 2006 of Nien 
Hsing Textile Co. 
 
                                                 
14 This is a modality where the subcontracting enterprise is responsible of the entire manufacturing of the client’s 
item. It receives the item’s design from the client, manufactures or buys the necessary intermediary inputs, cuts 
the fabric, sews the garment, and exports it to its client. 
15 Webpage of Nien Hsing Textile Co. (http://www.nht.com.tw/en/), consolidated financial statements for the 
years 2007 and 2006 of Nien Hsing Textile Co.  
16 “(The export processing zone is an industrial zone), the purpose of which is to attract export-oriented 
industries, by offering them especially favourable investment and trade conditions as compared with the 
remainder of the host country.” UNIDO (1980), “Export processing zones in developing countries”, UNIDO 
working paper on structural change 19 (cited in Dicken, 1998). 
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Labour costs are crucial in the labour intensive clothing industry, especially of standardised 
garments (e.g. T-shirts, knit-shirts, jeans and tweed trousers)17. Nonetheless, Nien Hsing 
Textile Co. did not decide to assemble trousers in Nicaragua because of labour costs: wages 
were lower in China, Vietnam and Cambodia. The main reason why it located in Nicaragua 
was that production in this country allowed it to circumvent US trade barriers. Contrary to 
Asian countries, Nicaragua, as well as the other Central American countries and the 
Dominican Republic, benefits from a free trade agreement with the United States: the DR-
CAFTA18. This agreement offers a tariff free access to the US market.  
 
Nicaragua has an additional advantage with respect to its neighbouring countries. It is the 
only country in the DR-CAFTA area which can export a substantial share of its clothing items 
to the United States without having to respect the rule of origin. That is, a share of its clothing 
items may use Asian fabric (up to 100 million square metres of fabric per year) without 
having to pay tariffs on the value of this fabric when it enters the United States. These square 
metres of Asian fabric exempted from tariffs are called Trade Preferential Levels (TPLs). The 
TPLs will disappear in 2016. However, all the clothing categories do not benefit in the same 
way of the TPLs. The firm that manufactures trousers and shorts must respect “the 1:1 
requirement” to qualify for the TPLs. That is, for each m2 of trouser or short made with Asian 
fabric, it must also export one m2 of pant or short made with US (more expensive) fabric until 
a specific annual quantity.  
 
Another advantage provided by a production location in Nicaragua is that this country will be 
allowed, just as Honduras, to maintain its free trade zones regime after 200919. The other DR-
CAFTA countries will then be forced to abandon this regime (Sánchez and Vos, 2006; Padilla 
et al., 2008).    
                                                 
17 The cost structure of a full-package jeans assembled in Nicaragua is approximately: 50% fabric cost; 25% 
assembly cost (cut, make and trim) and 25% the rest (trimmings cost (pocket, thread, zippers, buttons, etc.), 
transport cost, depreciation, profit margin of profit, etc.) (Interviews and O’Rourke Group, 2002, cited in 
Abernathy et al., 2005). 
18 In fact, the DR-CAFTA is a collection of specific bilateral trade agreements (involving each country with the 
United States) and not, as the name seems to indicate, a customs union between the seven countries. The free 
trade agreement between the United States and Nicaragua entered into force in April 2006. 
19 The World Trade Organisation wants to prohibit the industrial export processing zones regimes, because it 
considers that they infringe the rules of a free international trade. They are considered as a form of export 
subsidy. Poor countries (GDP per capita less than US $ 1,000 in US $ constant of 1990) will be the only 
countries authorized to maintain their export processing zones after 2009 (Sánchez and Vos, 2006; Padilla et al., 
2008). 
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3.2. Sony Manufacturing UK in Wales (2000-2001) 
Wales, an old mining country of some 3 million inhabitants, is one of the poorest regions of 
the United Kingdom20. It hosted many manufacturing subsidiaries (mainly from the electric 
and electronic goods industry (Sony, Matsushita, LG-Philips,…) and the automobile industry 
(Ford, Bosch,…)) at the turn of the century. In 1999, their activities contributed to 11% of 
Welsh GDP21. The important presence of multinational enterprises in Wales was explained, in 
large part, by the regional development policy followed by the authorities. This policy was 
mainly oriented towards the attraction (through grants and financial incentives for the foreign 
investor) of foreign direct investment (Phelps et al., 1998; Lovering, 1999; (Munday et al., 
1999).  
 
Sony – the Japanese consumer electronics enterprise – owned two manufacturing plants in 
South Wales (see Table 3). My interest focused on what were its two main manufacturing 
activities in 2000-2001: the assembly of television sets22 and the manufacturing of cathode 
ray tubes (the main component of the television set). The subsidiary possessed also a design 
and development department (design of new television set models).  
Table 3: Sony Manufacturing UK (2000) 
 Sony-Bridgend Sony-Pencoed 
Production (2000) Cathode ray tubes: ± 3 million units/year 
Television sets: ± 800.000 units/year 
Computer monitors: ± 600.000 units/year 
Professional broadcast cameras: 5-6 units/day 
Employment 
(December 2000) 1.300 persons 1.600 persons 
Establishment date 
of the plant 1974 1992 
Sources: Interviews at Sony and at the Welsh Development Agency and Sony-Bridgend’s web page 
(http:/www.bgd.sony.co.uk/aboutus.htm). 
 
The main reasons that explain why Sony decided to manufacture its television sets (since 
1974) and its cathode ray tubes (since 1982) in Europe were (Abo, 1989; Jie-A-Joen et al., 
1998):  
                                                 
20 Welsh GDP per head represented around 80% of the United Kingdom GDP per head. 
21 Slides of a presentation made by S. Hill (Changing Wales, 26/4/2000). 
22 When this research was made, Sony was not yet manufacturing flat-panel television sets (liquid crystal display 
or plasma) in Europe. Thus, when we talk about “television set” in this article we refer to the television set using 
a cathode ray tube. 
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− the existence of European trade barriers (tariffs, the necessity to respect the minimum 
local contents for its television sets assembled in Europe – the cathode ray tube represents 
around 50% of the production cost of the television set); 
− the relatively high transport costs of the television sets and the cathode ray tubes 
(especially the large size ones); 
− the fact that European production enabled it to adapt its production to the tastes and 
preferences of the European consumers and to respond swiftly to changes in demand. 
 
In 1974, Sony opened the Bridgend plant – Sony’s first manufacturing subsidiary in Europe – 
to assemble television sets for the UK and other European countries. The choice for a Welsh 
location can be explained, among other things, by the fact that a British site could be used as 
an exportation platform to the other European Common Market countries, the British market 
was relatively important, and Wales was well linked to important British cities and ports. The 
incentives offered by the Welsh government to Sony (lease of land and buildings and low 
interest-rate loan) also played a significant role (Abo, 1989; Escobar Rodriguez, 1999: 60). 
The permanence of the benevolent attitude of the public authorities23 contributes to explain 
why Sony continued to realize important investments in Wales until the end of the 1990s 
(setting up of the production line of cathode ray tubes in 1982, building of the Pencoed plant 
in 1992, etc.). 
 
4. Mobility potential of the manufacturing activities of the two subsidiaries 
 
Let us now analyse, with the help of the framework presented in the second section, the 
mobility potential of the two subsidiaries’ main manufacturing activities (on the one hand, the 
assembly of trousers and, on the other hand, the assembly of television sets and the 
manufacturing of cathode ray tubes).   
4.1. Territorial resources 1: employees 
Nien Hsing Textile Co.’s Nicaraguan plants employed essentially low-qualified local workers. 
High labour turnover by the shop floor workers24 seems to indicate that losing these workers’ 
knowledge did not preoccupy the plants’ managers. The high and middle management posts 
                                                 
23 Sony is the Japanese enterprise established in Wales that received most public grants (Regional Selective 
Assistance, Regional Development Grants) (Munday et al., 1995). 
24 In January 2007, 10% of the employees of Chih Hsing plant of Nien Hsing Textile Co. were replaced. 
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(plant production manager, division managers, and line managers) were almost exclusively 
occupied by expatriates (Taiwanese and mainland Chinese).  
 
The knowledge required by the shop floor workers of television set assembly in Sony-
Pencoed differed according to the stage. In the first stage of the television set’s assembly 
process – automatic insertion – the worker had to possess a diagnosis capacity and know how 
the machines worked. That is why the level of knowledge required was higher in this stage 
than in the two subsequent (manual) stages of the television sets’ assembly – manual insertion 
and final assembly – where most workers were employed (Escobar Rodriguez, 1999; 
Wilkinson et al., 2001).  
 
For his part, the Bridgend shop floor worker, who participated in the manufacturing of 
cathode ray tubes, did possess a diagnosis capacity in order to see when the automatic 
production process had a problem. This capacity required more training and experience than 
that possessed by the majority of the workers on the television sets’ assembly line25. Given 
the higher complexity of the production process, more engineers and other highly skilled 
technical personnel had to be offered by the host territory in cathode ray tube manufacturing 
than in television set assembly (Kenney, 1999). Furthermore, as with the shop floor workers, 
this higher complexity of production made the learning process by engineers longer than in 
television set assembly. 
4.2. Territorial resources 2: local suppliers 
Nien Hsing Textile Co.’s Nicaraguan plants practically did not have any relations with local 
enterprises: they imported, with the exception of the pumice stone26 and the cardboard boxes, 
the intermediary material inputs (fabric, buttons, zippers, thread, etc.) and the capital goods 
(sewing machines, washing machines, etc.) used in production. (The cardboard boxes were 
manufactured by Nien Hsing Textile Co. in its Nicaraguan plant Cartonera Industrial (see 
Table 2).) In addition, they did not carry out any process subcontracting (sewing, washing, 
ironing or packaging) among local enterprises or family workshops. 
                                                 
25 Actually, we have to be careful when we generalize conclusions concerning the shop floor workers’ 
knowledge; they do not form a homogeneous group even within the same stage of the production process: the 
knowledge needed by a first-line supervisor is not the same as that needed by a worker performing a simple, 
routinized assembly task. Still, we believe that, in great lines, we can distinguish the knowledge requirements of 
the two Sony plants. 
26 The pumice stone is a white volcanic stone, added to the jeans in the washing machine, that serves to discolour 
and age the jeans. The pumice stone comes from a Nicaraguan volcanic region. 
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Sony Manufacturing UK (Pencoed and Bridgend) did have local suppliers (indigenous 
suppliers and foreign capital suppliers set up in Wales). Experts underscored the quality of the 
linkages between Sony Manufacturing UK and its local suppliers (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; 
Potter, 2003). However, the indigenous suppliers were suppliers of relatively simple material 
inputs: plastic mouldings, metal pressings, packing material, and printed matter. The key 
components came from Sony’s other plants or from global suppliers (suppliers who also sell 
to Sony’s other manufacturing plants)27. The foreign capital local suppliers (generally 
Japanese) were usually accompanying suppliers of one or several Japanese OEM enterprises 
settled in Wales (e.g. Sony, Matsushita, Sharp). They delivered glass (for the cathode ray 
tube), plastic mouldings, wire harnesses, electronic components, and pressure injection plastic 
moulds (to make the television set and monitor cabinets) to Sony Manufacturing UK. The 
local suppliers limited thus only slightly the mobility potential of Sony’s two manufacturing 
activities (the indigenous suppliers offered essentially material inputs that suppliers from 
other regions were generally also able to offer; the key components came from Sony’s other 
plants or from global suppliers; the Japanese suppliers’ plants set up in Wales belonged to 
enterprises capable of accompanying their customer(s) to a new location). Furthermore, the 
tools that enabled the local suppliers to manufacture Sony’s specific components (e.g. the 
mould used in the manufacture of the cabinet, the tool necessary for the production of a metal 
part) belonged to Sony, contributing to the latter’s locational flexibility28. 
4.3.  Market access 
As we already commented, the main location advantage of Nicaragua for Nien Hsing Textile 
Co. was that it offered a tariff free access to the US market (DR-CAFTA and TPLs). 
However, before January 1, 2005, the Multi-Fibre Arrangement regulated international trade 
in the textile-clothing industry29, and the Nicaraguan location advantage for Asian clothing 
firms was even stronger with respect to Asian countries than in 2007: it allowed, contrary to 
                                                 
27 Significant economies of scale, specialized knowledge, reduction of transport costs and coordination and 
reduction of trade barriers encourage centralization, on a global scale, of the production of a large number of 
components. In addition, such global supply allows the MNE to realise purchasing economies: by buying a 
specific component for all of its production units from one supplier, it acquires significant negotiating power that 
allows negotiation of a preferential agreements (see, among others, Munday, 1995; Turok, 1993; Brown et al., 
2000; Sturgeon and Lester, 2003). 
28 If, for example, Sony decided to transfer the production of a television set model from Pencoed to Barcelona, 
it was also able to transfer that of the cabinet of this model. It would only need to take back the mould from its 
supplier in Wales to give it to one of its suppliers in Spain (see Brown et al., 2000). 
29 To be more precise, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing replaced the Multi-Fiber Arrangement regime in 
1995 and organized the gradual phase-out of quotas over a 10-year period (from 1995 until 2005). 
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Asian countries, a quota free access to the US market (ILO, 1997). Proximity to the US 
market has never been especially relevant: unlike differentiated garments (i.e. fashion 
garments for women) ordered in small series, proximity of assembly to the market is not that 
important for a standardised garment such as jeans trousers produced in large series and 
where price competitiveness is crucial (Padilla et al., 2008; Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003; 
Dicken, 2007)30. 
 
In the nineties, Wales saw one of its main location advantages for foreign investors – the 
preferential access to the European Union market – weaken. The Central and Eastern 
European countries, where wages were lower, had now the same access to this market. Sony 
had at its disposal a wider range of possible production locations in Europe. In this new 
environment, the assembly of television sets in Pencoed was still partly protected by the 
market proximity factor: the high transport costs of the large screen television sets (and 
cathode ray tubes). This explains why, in 2000, Sony’s European headquarters of the 
television sets business unit decided that this plant, situated close to Bridgend’s tube plant, 
would specialize in the production of large screen television sets. These sets were mostly sold 
in the British Isles and Northern Europe. 
4.4. Durable and specific assets 
As the other enterprises operating in the Nicaraguan export processing zones, Nien Hsing 
Textile Co. rented its buildings31. Only the buildings of the dyeing mill (Alpha Textil), located 
outside an export processing zone, belonged to the Taiwanese MNE. Furthermore, it used 
light capital goods (i.e. sewing machines, washing machines) that were often easy to transport 
and quickly depreciated32.  
 
Sony’s capital goods used in the assembly of television sets (essentially, the conveyor belts 
and the automatic insertion and control machines) were easily transportable. The trade 
                                                 
30 The absence of local suppliers is also a factor that limits the capacity of the maquiladora firm to respond 
rapidly to changes in demand as well as to operate in just in time. Without local suppliers, it needs to maintain 
important inventories of intermediate goods (Padilla et al., 2008; Abernathy et al., 2005; Condo et al., 2004).     
31 As the former executive secretary of the manager of the public export processing zone (zona franca Las 
Mercedes) laconically commented (interview), the foreign maquiladoras companies have to be offered the 
buildings in the free trade zones for rent, because otherwise they would not come: “the building cannot be taken 
off elsewhere, while the machines can.” 
32 In this regard, an employee of the public export processing zone (zona franca Las Mercedes) affirmed 
(interview) that “if one wants it, one puts the machines in a container and they are ready to be shipped to another 
country”. 
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unions’ representatives33 talked about a television sets’ assembly line that was like a 
meccano: it could easily be dismantled and then reassembled in another place. The expensive 
and immobile capital goods (i.e. the big ovens used to weld the glass34) used in the 
manufacturing of cathode ray tubes could not be easily sold or transferred to another place: 
they were specific (to a production and to a place) and durable35.   
4.5. Possession of substitute plants 
Nien Hsing Textile Co. had plants assembling trousers in Lesotho, Mexico and opened and 
bought, in 2006, three factories in Vietnam and Cambodia. The latter were located farther 
away from the US market than the Nicaraguan plants, and these two Asian countries did not 
benefit from the trade policy advantages that Nicaragua offered, but they had significantly 
lower labour costs. 
 
In 2000-2001, Sony possessed three European plants assembling television sets: in Wales 
(Pencoed), in Spain (Barcelona), and in Slovakia (Trnava). There were thus alternative sites 
that could take over Sony-Pencoed’s activity. The transfer of the production of small and 
medium screen television set models from the Pencoed plant to the Barcelona and Trnava 
plants, which took place in 2000, corroborates this operational flexibility36. For its part, Sony-
Bridgend had the advantage of being Sony’s only European plant manufacturing cathode ray 
tubes. This was due to the important plant scale economies existing in this production. 
Economically speaking, it did not make sense for Sony to have two plants manufacturing 
cathode ray tubes in Europe37. Furthermore, the Bridgend plant was protected from Sony’s 
non-European plants that manufacture cathode ray tubes, by the European tariffs and the 
rather high transport costs (especially for large size tubes) of this component. 
                                                 
33 Interview. 
34 A new tube factory costed around US$150 million (Khurana, 1999).  
35 As an ex-manager of Sony Manufacturing UK pointed out (interview), “you can’t move Bridgend; it’s a 
building”. 
36 This entailed a reduction of the production of one million television sets per year in Pencoed and the loss of 
nearly 500 jobs.. 
37 A. Khurana (1999) situated the optimal scale of production (at the level of the plant) of cathode ray tubes – the 
minimum production level that a plant must reach to be able to produce at the lowest possible unit cost – at 
around 2-3 million tubes per year. In the assembly of television sets, this optimal scale of production is estimated 
to be only about 400.000 units per year (Dicken, 1998).  
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4.6. Summary 
We can see that if there was any change in the configuration of the location advantages, Nien 
Hsing Textile Co. could easily take off towards other horizons: it did not depend on specific 
Nicaraguan location advantages, its sunk investments38 in this country were low (and 
redundancy costs were low (MEC, 2003)).  That is why the maquiladora firms such as the 
Nien Hsing Textile Co.’s plants were frequently called “swallow firms” (empresas 
golondrinas) in the Caribbean Basin. 
 
As for Sony, the assembly of television sets was the activity that could most easily be 
transferred to another territory. The manufacturing of cathode ray tubes was anchored in the 
host territory, in great part, thanks to the heavy capital goods used in production.  
 
5. Final thoughts 
5.1. Cost competition and absence of embeddedness 
In both cases, there was a vigorous cost competition in the MNE’s product market (the jeans’ 
assembly service and the television set). 
 
One may wonder if such a vigorous cost competition doesn’t constitute a barrier to the 
embededness of the MNE’s subsidiary within the host economy.  
 
Given its narrow profit margin, Nien Hsing Textile Co. was very sensitive to small changes in 
wages costs in trouser assembly, the costs of intermediate inputs, and the prices of the full-
package service. Besides, the location advantages of Nicaragua were fragile for Nien Hsing 
Textile Co.: they were “political” or artificial. All this helps to explain why Nien Hsing 
Textile Co. wanted to retain its locational flexibility. Making significant investments in heavy 
capital goods (spinning machine, weaving machine etc.), establishing long-term economic 
linkages with the local suppliers, and employing and training local managers would be in 
contradiction with this determination to maintain the international mobility of its 
                                                 
38 Sunk cost (or investment) is a cost which, once it has been incurred, cannot be recovered by means of sale or 
transfer (the use, by the firm, of the acquired capital good in another activity or another place). 
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manufacturing activities (see Madani, 1999). This wish must partly explain why there had not 
been any genuine upgrading of Nien Hsing Textile Co. in Nicaragua (van Wunnik, 2001).  
 
As for Sony Manufacturing UK, its profit margin on the production of tube television sets was 
also narrow. Furthermore, this production was characterized by a relatively high weight of 
wage costs in the production costs (they represented roughly 10% of the total production cost 
of a tube television set). Such a proportion forces the MNE to be able to delocalise the 
production of such a good to low-wage countries, which have access to the same market39 
(Pottier, 2003). Perhaps this explains why the status of Sony Manufacturing UK’s indigenous 
suppliers did not evolve in the nineties: they remained suppliers of simple and bulky material 
inputs at satisfactory conditions for Sony Manufacturing UK (just in time delivery if 
necessary, no inward inspection and low cost) by suppliers that did not design the component 
(Sony came to the supplier with the blueprint) (Escobar Rodriguez, 1999; Williams, 1999). 
Sony did not need other indigenous suppliers. Pressures to minimize costs (the procurement 
costs of components represent an important part of the total production cost) favoured global 
sourcing. This, combined with the use of Japanese accompanying suppliers in Wales, left little 
room for a quantitative and qualitative development of Sony’s relations with indigenous 
suppliers (see Brown et al., 2000; Sturgeon and Lester, 2003).    
5.2. FDI trap   
The host territory offering specific resources to the MNE can escape, in great part, from cost 
competition (i.e. low wages, grants, tax exemptions, low taxes) with other territories to attract 
FDI. This is not the case for the host territory, which only offers generic resources. Here, 
competition to attract FDI will be fundamentally based on costs and market access. 
Furthermore, the continuation of the MNEs on its soil will also depend on “political” or 
artificial location advantages that are precarious, as they merely reflect a political decision. If 
this occurs, the MNE will not want to have an “active or constructive approach” to the host 
territory40, the latter’s resources will not upgrade, and the host territory will not be able to 
develop its resources to be able to attract another kind of MNE activities.  
                                                 
39 Actually, this analyse should be deepened to also take into account the indirect employment wage cost – the 
wage costs embodied in the material inputs acquired by the MNE in the host territory (e.g. cabinets, wire 
harnesses).    
40 The MNE, wishing to maintain its locational flexibility, has what H. Krifa and F. Héran (1999) call a “passive 
approach to the territory”: it limits itself to the exploitation of useful resources available in the host territory. It 
has no interest in building up resources in the host territory – “the active approach to the territory” – such as, for 
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6. Postscript 
6.1. Exit of Nien Hsing Textile Co. from Nicaragua 
In 2008, Nien Hsing Textile Co. closed five of its six establishments: the only one that is still 
open is Alpha Textile (the factory that dyes fabric and the only factory whose buildings are 
owned by Nien Hsing Textile Co.). Some 15.000 direct jobs were lost. It seems that the group 
decided to move its production base from Nicaragua to Vietnam and Cambodia (Business 
Week, 2008; Oppenheimer, 2007).  
 
The TPLs was not a sufficient reason to continue producing in Nicaragua. Probably, the “1:1 
requirement” greatly limited the advantage of the TPLs for trousers (North American fabric is 
more expensive than Asian fabric) (Jansen et al., 2007)41. Moreover, Nicaragua has lost one 
of its two political location advantage over its neighbouring countries: the World Trade 
Organisation decided, in July 2007, to allow 19 other countries (including Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic) to keep their free trade export processing 
zones beyond 2009 until 2015 (Aguilera, 2007). Other factors, such as the new political 
context of the country (the coming to power of the Sandinista candidate, Daniel Ortega, who 
has good relations with Hugo Chávez) and the adverse economic situation prevalent in the 
United States, probably also played a part in this decision (Oppenheimer, 2007; Olivares, 
2008a).  
6.2. Closure of Sony-Bridgend and transfer of the television set assembly  
In June 2005, tube television set assembly was transferred to Sony’s Slovakian plant in 
Trnava leaving Sony-Pencoed with 300 employees and the production of professional 
broadcast cameras and circuit boards for the flat panel television sets assembled in Sony-
Barcelona (Barry, 2005a). Furthermore, cathode ray tube manufacturing had been stopped by 
Sony in Europe, and Sony-Bridgend closed, due to the success of the new liquid crystal and 
plasma display technologies. Only new investments in new product lines would have 
authorised a restructuring of Sony Manufacturing UK, but they did not arrive. Products have a 
                                                                                                                                                        
example, training workers exhaustively or collaborating with local suppliers in the development of complex 
components. 
41 Nien Textile Co. did not abide by the “1:1 requirement”. Following this breach, the group saw the number of 
TPLs it was allocated annually diminish. This apparently speeded up its decision to relocate its production to 
Vietnam and Cambodia (Olivares, 2008b).    
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life cycle and plants have to win the next investment cycle to survive (Phelps and Fuller, 
2000). This disengagement of Sony from Wales was followed by the decision of Sony’s 
accompanying Japanese suppliers of glass for the cathode ray tube (Nippon Electric Glass – 
590 employees) and cabinets (Mitsubishi – 129 employees) to shut their facility in Wales 
(Barry, 2005b; Cundy, 2005).  
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